a collection of writeups and tools related to ~embedded device ~hacking
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2018-05-22 22:08:31 -07:00
cujo fixing typo 2017-02-20 11:50:36 -08:00
hootoo updating the Hootoo writeup with some WIP IPCam notes 2016-07-19 07:04:53 -07:00
i-Bright7x for all intents and purposes, their website is now offline, adding source files that may not be available anywhere else any more 2018-05-22 21:52:20 -07:00
lametric minor updates 2017-03-22 16:21:49 -07:00
lg_webOS mostly minor cleanup changes 2017-01-28 16:20:36 -08:00
lib useful tools, probably should be part of ctf 2016-11-28 19:17:47 -08:00
mifi mostly minor cleanup changes 2017-01-28 16:20:36 -08:00
rav-filehub fixing markdown 2016-07-08 21:11:36 -07:00
revolabs-flx_uc_1000 cleaning up markdown 2018-05-22 22:08:31 -07:00
solu not adding to index since site has been taken down, but can now add without notification 2018-05-22 21:03:50 -07:00
ubiquiti/mfi now fixing the file 2017-03-06 13:05:28 -08:00
weemo updating weemo 2017-06-21 22:41:18 -07:00
.gitignore everything except actually rooting the device 2017-03-12 17:12:58 -07:00
README.md can get the SSID password, which is unchangeable from the MAC address of the device - not uid=0, but pretty bad 2018-05-22 20:32:14 -07:00

h4ck

a collection of writeups and tools related to ~embedded device ~hacking

shiny devices are fun, finding and poking holes in their interface is a lot of fun

devices

name description url
CUJO purposeful MiTM device for internet 'security' cujo
LG webOS HTTP phone home is never a good idea lg-webOS
HooToo TripMate series there are lots of problems, some end up at root access hootoo
TriCascade i-Bright7x work in progress, SSID password from MAC address, telnet but no access i-Bright7x
Lametric Time WiFi/internet enabled clock/LED display, unnecessary services exposed, root access obtainable lametric
Philips Hue device communication insecure, Ruby library/CLI to control via REST HTTP hued
RAV FileHub a HooToo by any other name.. but with a twist rav-filehub
RevoLabs flx UC1000 more than just brute forcing the PIN revolabs-flx_uc_1000
Ubiquiti mFi mPower root access trivially obtained, credential leakage, unnecessary services exposed ubiquiti/mFi
Belkin Weemo Mini work in progress, recon mostly done weemo