mostly minor cleanup changes
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Conor Horan-Kates
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.gitignore
vendored
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.gitignore
vendored
@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ debian-binary
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# lg binaries
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_ipk-*
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_downloaded
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*extracted*
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# temp files
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@ -8,14 +8,13 @@
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- [phone home](#phone-home)
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## TV
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name|value
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----|-----
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model|TODO
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product|`TODO`
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firmware|`TODO`
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features|TODO
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vulnerabilities|all phone-home calls are done over `HTTP`
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name | value
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----------------|-----
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model | `TODO`
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product | `TODO`
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firmware | `TODO`
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features | TODO
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vulnerabilities | all phone-home calls are done over `HTTP`
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## digging
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@ -37,8 +36,8 @@ so.. no open ports. let's try something different
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watching the network activity of the device (`192.168.1.108`), noticed it tried to resolve:
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* agent.cujo.io
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* jenkins.getcujo.com
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* `agent.cujo.io`
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* `jenkins.getcujo.com`
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but since the network isn't allowing external traffic, the DNS resolution fails.
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@ -362,12 +362,120 @@ key | value
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since the `update_minor_ver` specified is greater than the existing value (`30.40`), the TV prompts the user that an upgrade is available.
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the traffic after the user chooses to upgrade:
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the traffic after the user chooses to upgrade starts with a `GET` of the `image_url`:
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```
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GET /fizzbuzz HTTP/1.1
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Accept: */*
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Host: snu.lge.com
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Range: bytes=0-1715
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Connection: Closed
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```
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<TODO finish this writeup and hack>
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followed by 5 retries, since they all received 404 as we're not sure what the format of the update actually is (yet), but assume it will be an `.ipk` as well.
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then some base64 encoded data with a log :
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```
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POST /SWDownloadStartLog.laf HTTP/1.1
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Accept: */*
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User-Agent: User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
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Host: snu.lge.com:80
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Connection: Keep-Alive
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Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
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Content-Length: 268
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PFJFUVVFU1Q+CjxSRVFfSUQ+MDAwMDAwMDAwMDg2MTMyNDQ2NjA8L1JFUV9JRD4KPFBST0RVQ1RfTk0+d2ViT1NUViAzLjA8L1BST0RVQ1RfTk0+CjxNT0RFTF9OTT5IRV9EVFZfVzE2UF9BRkFEQVRBQTwvTU9ERUxfTk0+CjxTV19UWVBFPkZJUk1XQVJFPC9TV19UWVBFPgo8SU1BR0VfTkFNRT5maXp6YnV6ejwvSU1BR0VfTkFNRT4KPC9SRVFVRVNUPgo=
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```
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decoded:
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```xml
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<REQUEST>
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<REQ_ID>00000000008613244660</REQ_ID>
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<PRODUCT_NM>webOSTV 3.0</PRODUCT_NM>
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<MODEL_NM>HE_DTV_W16P_AFADATAA</MODEL_NM>
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<SW_TYPE>FIRMWARE</SW_TYPE>
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<IMAGE_NAME>fizzbuzz</IMAGE_NAME>
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</REQUEST>
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```
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and then some similar data to a different endpoint:
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```
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POST /DownloadResult.laf HTTP/1.1
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Accept: */*
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User-Agent: User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
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Host: snu.lge.com:80
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Connection: Keep-Alive
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Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
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Content-Length: 308
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PFJFUVVFU1Q+CjxSRVFfSUQ+MDAwMDAwMDAwMDg2MTMyNDQ2NjA8L1JFUV9JRD4KPFBST0RVQ1RfTk0+d2ViT1NUViAzLjA8L1BST0RVQ1RfTk0+CjxNT0RFTF9OTT5IRV9EVFZfVzE2UF9BRkFEQVRBQTwvTU9ERUxfTk0+CjxTV19UWVBFPkZJUk1XQVJFPC9TV19UWVBFPgo8VVBEQVRFX1JFU1VMVD43MjI8L1VQREFURV9SRVNVTFQ+CjxSRVRSWV9DT1VOVD4wPC9SRVRSWV9DT1VOVD4KPC9SRVFVRVNUPgo=
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```
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decoded:
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```xml
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<REQUEST>
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<REQ_ID>00000000008613244660</REQ_ID>
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<PRODUCT_NM>webOSTV 3.0</PRODUCT_NM>
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<MODEL_NM>HE_DTV_W16P_AFADATAA</MODEL_NM>
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<SW_TYPE>FIRMWARE</SW_TYPE>
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<UPDATE_RESULT>722</UPDATE_RESULT>
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<RETRY_COUNT>0</RETRY_COUNT>
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</REQUEST>
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```
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so, now we know what the process is, just need to determine what the format/contents of the OS update is.
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after shutting down `impersonate-lge.com.rb`, the real `snu.lge.com` responds to `/CheckSWAutoUpdate.laf` with:
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```
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GET /GlobalSWDownloadCdn.laf?IMG=/<redacted>-prodkey_nsu_V3_SECURED.epk HTTP/1.1
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Accept: */*
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Host: su.lge.com:80
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Range: bytes=0-1715
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Connection: Closed
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```
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taking a look at the (850mb) file:
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```
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$ binwalk -v --dd='.*' <redacted>-prodkey_nsu_V3_SECURED.epk
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Scan Time: 2016-12-28 22:41:37
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Target File: <redacted>-prodkey_nsu_V3_SECURED.epk
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MD5 Checksum: eadf4625c8033f286f7459766558d43b
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Signatures: 344
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DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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1437257 0x15EE49 HPACK archive data
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88501492 0x5466CF4 StuffIt Deluxe Segment (data): f
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116751487 0x6F57C7F VMware4 disk image
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151796947 0x90C3CD3 LANCOM OEM file
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184522619 0xAFF977B MySQL ISAM compressed data file Version 4
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188949815 0xB432537 QEMU QCOW Image
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202964337 0xC18FD71 MySQL ISAM compressed data file Version 8
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360991579 0x15844B5B MySQL ISAM compressed data file Version 9
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403720767 0x18104A3F MySQL ISAM compressed data file Version 5
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438498638 0x1A22F54E Cisco IOS experimental microcode, for ""
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558916980 0x21506574 QEMU QCOW Image
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652690023 0x26E74267 COBALT boot rom data (Flat boot rom or file system)
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673373671 0x2822DDE7 StuffIt Deluxe Segment (data): f
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752461107 0x2CD9A533 MySQL ISAM index file Version 11
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798709823 0x2F9B583F LANCOM OEM file
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828143551 0x315C77BF MySQL ISAM index file Version 11
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828353910 0x315FAD76 MySQL ISAM compressed data file Version 4
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```
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however, given the 'encrypted' portion of the filename and the fact that none of the files are actually usable as the type indicated here
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- the encryption is throwing off `binwalk` file type detection
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attempting to find an unencrypted version of the file by fuzzing the original URL has, so far, proved unsuccessful.
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# TODO how would we determine the type of encryption in order to start attacking it?
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## channel guide
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@ -28,9 +28,15 @@ get '/fts/:file' do |file|
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hash = params['hash'] # 6Vsai7Ky71UPgetV
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mtime = params['mtime'] # 1479098823000
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fake_ipk_name = '16881482.ipk'
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fake_ipk_name = sprintf('%s.ipk', key)
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real_ipk_file = File.join(settings.public_folder, '/gfts/base-files.ipk')
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if mtime
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mtime_int = Time.at(mtime.to_i / 1000).to_i
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mtime_args = Time.at(mtime_int).strftime('%Y%m%d%H%M')
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`touch -t #{mtime_args} #{real_ipk_file}`
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end
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headers(
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'Content-Disposition' => sprintf('attachment; filename="%s"', fake_ipk_name),
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'Content-Transfer-Encoding' => 'binary',
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@ -38,7 +44,7 @@ get '/fts/:file' do |file|
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'Server' => 'Apache',
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)
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send_file real_ipk_file
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send_file(real_ipk_file)
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elsif target_host.match(/ngfts/)
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## channel searching -- images / thumbnails
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@ -35,7 +35,5 @@ end
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# TODO first we mimic the encoding, then we can decode
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encoded = rstr2hex(rstr_sha1(str2rstr_utf8(password)))
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puts sprintf('%s %s', decoded, "\n")
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puts sprintf('%s', encoded)
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puts sprintf('%s', decoded)
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