adding i-Bright7x

README.md

@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@ name | description | url
 [CUJO](http://trycujo.com) | purposeful MiTM device for internet 'security' | [cujo](cujo)
 [LG webOS](http://www.lge.com) | HTTP phone home is never a good idea | [lg-webOS](lg_webOS)
 [HooToo TripMate series](http://www.hootoo.com) | there are lots of problems, some end up at root access | [hootoo](hootoo)
+[TriCascade i-Bright7x](http://www.tricascade.com/i-bright7x-smart-surge-protector/) | work in progress, some recon done | [i-Bright7x](i-Bright7x)
 [Lametric Time](http://lametric.com) | WiFi/internet enabled clock/LED display, unnecessary services exposed, root access obtainable | [lametric](lametric)
 [Philips Hue](http://www.meethue.com) | device communication insecure, Ruby library/CLI to control via REST HTTP | [hued](https://github.com/chorankates/hued)
 [RAV FileHub](http://www.ravpower.com/ravpower-rp-wd02-filehub-6000mah-power-bank.html) | a HooToo by any other name.. but with a twist | [rav-filehub](rav-filehub)
 [RevoLabs flx UC1000](http://www.revolabs.com/products/conference-phones/wired-conference-phones/flx-uc-phones/flx-uc-1000-speakerphone) | more than just brute forcing the PIN | [revolabs-flx_uc_1000](revolabs-flx_uc_1000)
 [Ubiquiti mFi mPower](https://www.ubnt.com/mfi/mpower/) | root access trivially obtained, credential leakage, unnecessary services exposed | [ubiquiti/mFi](ubiquiti/mfi)
-[Weemo Mini]() | work in progress, recon mostly done | [weemo](weemo)
+[Belkin Weemo Mini](http://www.belkin.com/us/p/P-F7C063/) | work in progress, recon mostly done | [weemo](weemo)

i-Bright7x/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+# TriCascade i-Bright7x
+
+- [device](#device)
+- [digging](#digging)
+  - [nmap](#nmap)
+  - [jnlp](#jnlp)
+
+## device
+name     | value
+---------|-----
+model    | i-Bright7x
+firmware | unknown currently
+features | WiFi capable remote controled power supply. that runs linux
+
+## digging
+
+### nmap
+
+from `nmap -PN -sV -p 1-65535 192.168.17.1`, get:
+
+```
+PORT     STATE SERVICE VERSION
+23/tcp   open  telnet  BusyBox telnetd
+53/tcp   open  domain  dnsmasq 2.59rc1
+80/tcp   open  http
+8080/tcp open  http    GoAhead WebServer
+```
+
+the same service looks to be running on both `80` and `8080`, prompting for a username and password, but none are provided by the manufacturer.
+
+it appears that the only way to configure this device is to use the Java applet through [bright.tricascade.com](https://bright.tricascade.com)
+
+### jnlp
+
+by watching traffic, see that the applet is served from [resources/applet/WifiDevice.jnlp](https://bright.tricascade.com/resources/applet/WiFiDeviceAPI.jnlp)
+
+finding the corresponding `.jar` was more of a pain than expected, basically:
+
+```
+$ find ~/Library/Application Support/Oracle/Java/Deployment/cache/6.0 -type f -exec file {} \;
+./10/78085f0a-4eab1a82: XML 1.0 document text, ASCII text, with CRLF, LF line terminators
+./10/78085f0a-4eab1a82.idx: data
+./10/78085f0a-c5a84a41ecc99150f548eb0393049f0d8c67849abe845af78c894a676aa18086-6.0.lap: ASCII text
+./39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-: Java archive data (JAR)
+./39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-.idx: data
+./45/4766c42d-176a5aa0: XML 1.0 document text, ASCII text, with CRLF, LF line terminators
+./45/4766c42d-176a5aa0.idx: data
+./45/4766c42d-8bd095d4847349acdbba85a1e70f0d08d3990cfbb19c6007fde8f07bf0b52dbd-6.0.lap: ASCII text
+./63/4600b2ff-0e27775cc2e9212bf6c7096ed895db16ef7cdd6b6f1d4e615eec8c92787d0f53-6.0.lap: ASCII text
+./63/4d02c2bf-562ad327: Java archive data (JAR)
+./63/4d02c2bf-562ad327.idx: data
+...
+$ 7z l 39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-
+Listing archive: ./39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-
+
+--
+Path = ./39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-
+Type = zip
+Physical Size = 77973
+
+   Date      Time    Attr         Size   Compressed  Name
+------------------- ----- ------------ ------------  ------------------------
+2015-06-12 19:10:02 .....         8149         3263  META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
+2015-06-12 19:10:04 .....         7954         3196  META-INF/BRIGHTEN.SF
+2015-06-12 19:10:04 .....         6165         4081  META-INF/BRIGHTEN.RSA
+2015-06-12 19:10:02 .....         2232          884  com/insnergy/wifi/applet/b.class
+```
+
+lucky guess.
+
+unzipping gives a bit of a clue about the structure - but nothing really interesting.
+
+[decompiling](decompile.sh) with the help of [cfr](http://www.benf.org/other/cfr/), however, does give us some hints:
+
+```java
+// from com/insnergy/wifi/value/DeviceAP.java
+
+    public final String getSsid(String string) {
+        return this.ssidPattern + DeviceAP.extractMac(string);
+    }
+
+    public static String extractMac(String string) {
+        return string.substring(8, 20);
+    }
+
+    public final String getPassword(String string) {
+        return a.a(DeviceAP.extractMac(string)).substring(0, 10).toLowerCase();
+    }
+```
+
+it looks like the password is derived from the MAC address of the device - which is worse than it sounds, because the WiFi network it exposes for configuration is `'B7' + $MAC_ADDRESS`
+
+```java
+// from com/insnergy/wifi/applet/e.java
+
+    public final void run() {
+        try {
+            if (b.a((CharSequence)this.a.a) || !RegexPattern.DEVICE_ID.isValid(this.a.a)) {
+                throw new ApiException("Not a valid device ID : " + this.a.a);
+            }
+            DeviceAP deviceAP = DeviceAP.of(this.a.a);
+            WiFiDeviceAPI.a(this.a.b, deviceAP.getSsid(this.a.a), deviceAP.getPassword(this.a.a));
+            Thread.sleep(1000);
+            WiFiDeviceAPI.b(this.a.b, WiFiDeviceAPI.d(this.a.b).trigger(), "");
+            return;
+        }
+...
+```
+
+in a roundabout way, we're right: the MAC address is being pulled out of the device ID, which is `'TC060000' + $MAC_ADDRESS`, hence the `substring`
+
+additionally, it looks like the signature for `a` is `($IP, $SSID, $PASSWORD)`
+
+```java
+// from com/insnergy/wifi/device/api/c.java
+
+    public final Connect a(String object, String string, String string2, String string3) {
+        String string4 = "Connect?ssid={0}&secmode={1}&encrypt={2}";
+        MessageFormat messageFormat = new MessageFormat(string4);
+        if (b.b((CharSequence)string3)) {
+            messageFormat = new MessageFormat(string4 + "&conpass={3}");
+        }
+        object = this.a(messageFormat, new String[]{object, string, string2, string3});
+        return (Connect)this.a((JSONObject)object, new Connect());
+    }
+```
+
+
+```java
+//
+    protected a(String string, String string2) {
+        String string3 = "http://192.168.17.1:8080/goform/";
+        int n = 30000;
+        if (com.insnergy.wifi.b.b.b((CharSequence)string)) {
+            string3 = string;
+        }
+        if (com.insnergy.wifi.b.b.c(string2)) {
+            n = Integer.parseInt(string2);
+        }
+        this.b = string3;
+        this.c = n;
+    }
+
+```
+
+this is the only reference to this address, have not dug to deeply
+
+
+password: 97451790c9
+
+key  | value
+-----|-------
+MAC  | `8C:C7:AA:02:97:48`
+SSID | `B78CC7AA029748` // so.. 'B7' + $MAC
+ID   | `TC0600008CC7AA029748` // so 'TC060000' + $MAC
+
+8CC7AA029748 in decimal is 154789178677064