adding i-Bright7x

This commit is contained in:
Conor Horan-Kates 2017-06-21 22:41:04 -07:00
parent e6b05b9504
commit 94c023fd2f
2 changed files with 159 additions and 1 deletions

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[CUJO](http://trycujo.com) | purposeful MiTM device for internet 'security' | [cujo](cujo)
[LG webOS](http://www.lge.com) | HTTP phone home is never a good idea | [lg-webOS](lg_webOS)
[HooToo TripMate series](http://www.hootoo.com) | there are lots of problems, some end up at root access | [hootoo](hootoo)
[TriCascade i-Bright7x](http://www.tricascade.com/i-bright7x-smart-surge-protector/) | work in progress, some recon done | [i-Bright7x](i-Bright7x)
[Lametric Time](http://lametric.com) | WiFi/internet enabled clock/LED display, unnecessary services exposed, root access obtainable | [lametric](lametric)
[Philips Hue](http://www.meethue.com) | device communication insecure, Ruby library/CLI to control via REST HTTP | [hued](https://github.com/chorankates/hued)
[RAV FileHub](http://www.ravpower.com/ravpower-rp-wd02-filehub-6000mah-power-bank.html) | a HooToo by any other name.. but with a twist | [rav-filehub](rav-filehub)
[RevoLabs flx UC1000](http://www.revolabs.com/products/conference-phones/wired-conference-phones/flx-uc-phones/flx-uc-1000-speakerphone) | more than just brute forcing the PIN | [revolabs-flx_uc_1000](revolabs-flx_uc_1000)
[Ubiquiti mFi mPower](https://www.ubnt.com/mfi/mpower/) | root access trivially obtained, credential leakage, unnecessary services exposed | [ubiquiti/mFi](ubiquiti/mfi)
[Weemo Mini]() | work in progress, recon mostly done | [weemo](weemo)
[Belkin Weemo Mini](http://www.belkin.com/us/p/P-F7C063/) | work in progress, recon mostly done | [weemo](weemo)

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i-Bright7x/README.md Normal file
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# TriCascade i-Bright7x
- [device](#device)
- [digging](#digging)
- [nmap](#nmap)
- [jnlp](#jnlp)
## device
name | value
---------|-----
model | i-Bright7x
firmware | unknown currently
features | WiFi capable remote controled power supply. that runs linux
## digging
### nmap
from `nmap -PN -sV -p 1-65535 192.168.17.1`, get:
```
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
23/tcp open telnet BusyBox telnetd
53/tcp open domain dnsmasq 2.59rc1
80/tcp open http
8080/tcp open http GoAhead WebServer
```
the same service looks to be running on both `80` and `8080`, prompting for a username and password, but none are provided by the manufacturer.
it appears that the only way to configure this device is to use the Java applet through [bright.tricascade.com](https://bright.tricascade.com)
### jnlp
by watching traffic, see that the applet is served from [resources/applet/WifiDevice.jnlp](https://bright.tricascade.com/resources/applet/WiFiDeviceAPI.jnlp)
finding the corresponding `.jar` was more of a pain than expected, basically:
```
$ find ~/Library/Application Support/Oracle/Java/Deployment/cache/6.0 -type f -exec file {} \;
./10/78085f0a-4eab1a82: XML 1.0 document text, ASCII text, with CRLF, LF line terminators
./10/78085f0a-4eab1a82.idx: data
./10/78085f0a-c5a84a41ecc99150f548eb0393049f0d8c67849abe845af78c894a676aa18086-6.0.lap: ASCII text
./39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-: Java archive data (JAR)
./39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-.idx: data
./45/4766c42d-176a5aa0: XML 1.0 document text, ASCII text, with CRLF, LF line terminators
./45/4766c42d-176a5aa0.idx: data
./45/4766c42d-8bd095d4847349acdbba85a1e70f0d08d3990cfbb19c6007fde8f07bf0b52dbd-6.0.lap: ASCII text
./63/4600b2ff-0e27775cc2e9212bf6c7096ed895db16ef7cdd6b6f1d4e615eec8c92787d0f53-6.0.lap: ASCII text
./63/4d02c2bf-562ad327: Java archive data (JAR)
./63/4d02c2bf-562ad327.idx: data
...
$ 7z l 39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-
Listing archive: ./39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-
--
Path = ./39/3dc5b4e7-2469db01-1.4.2-
Type = zip
Physical Size = 77973
Date Time Attr Size Compressed Name
------------------- ----- ------------ ------------ ------------------------
2015-06-12 19:10:02 ..... 8149 3263 META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
2015-06-12 19:10:04 ..... 7954 3196 META-INF/BRIGHTEN.SF
2015-06-12 19:10:04 ..... 6165 4081 META-INF/BRIGHTEN.RSA
2015-06-12 19:10:02 ..... 2232 884 com/insnergy/wifi/applet/b.class
```
lucky guess.
unzipping gives a bit of a clue about the structure - but nothing really interesting.
[decompiling](decompile.sh) with the help of [cfr](http://www.benf.org/other/cfr/), however, does give us some hints:
```java
// from com/insnergy/wifi/value/DeviceAP.java
public final String getSsid(String string) {
return this.ssidPattern + DeviceAP.extractMac(string);
}
public static String extractMac(String string) {
return string.substring(8, 20);
}
public final String getPassword(String string) {
return a.a(DeviceAP.extractMac(string)).substring(0, 10).toLowerCase();
}
```
it looks like the password is derived from the MAC address of the device - which is worse than it sounds, because the WiFi network it exposes for configuration is `'B7' + $MAC_ADDRESS`
```java
// from com/insnergy/wifi/applet/e.java
public final void run() {
try {
if (b.a((CharSequence)this.a.a) || !RegexPattern.DEVICE_ID.isValid(this.a.a)) {
throw new ApiException("Not a valid device ID : " + this.a.a);
}
DeviceAP deviceAP = DeviceAP.of(this.a.a);
WiFiDeviceAPI.a(this.a.b, deviceAP.getSsid(this.a.a), deviceAP.getPassword(this.a.a));
Thread.sleep(1000);
WiFiDeviceAPI.b(this.a.b, WiFiDeviceAPI.d(this.a.b).trigger(), "");
return;
}
...
```
in a roundabout way, we're right: the MAC address is being pulled out of the device ID, which is `'TC060000' + $MAC_ADDRESS`, hence the `substring`
additionally, it looks like the signature for `a` is `($IP, $SSID, $PASSWORD)`
```java
// from com/insnergy/wifi/device/api/c.java
public final Connect a(String object, String string, String string2, String string3) {
String string4 = "Connect?ssid={0}&secmode={1}&encrypt={2}";
MessageFormat messageFormat = new MessageFormat(string4);
if (b.b((CharSequence)string3)) {
messageFormat = new MessageFormat(string4 + "&conpass={3}");
}
object = this.a(messageFormat, new String[]{object, string, string2, string3});
return (Connect)this.a((JSONObject)object, new Connect());
}
```
```java
//
protected a(String string, String string2) {
String string3 = "http://192.168.17.1:8080/goform/";
int n = 30000;
if (com.insnergy.wifi.b.b.b((CharSequence)string)) {
string3 = string;
}
if (com.insnergy.wifi.b.b.c(string2)) {
n = Integer.parseInt(string2);
}
this.b = string3;
this.c = n;
}
```
this is the only reference to this address, have not dug to deeply
password: 97451790c9
key | value
-----|-------
MAC | `8C:C7:AA:02:97:48`
SSID | `B78CC7AA029748` // so.. 'B7' + $MAC
ID | `TC0600008CC7AA029748` // so 'TC060000' + $MAC
8CC7AA029748 in decimal is 154789178677064