h4ck/lg_webOS
2016-11-28 17:25:47 -08:00
..
_ipk-building cleaning up generated files 2016-11-28 17:22:44 -08:00
_public adding some fake files to respond with, even if they are binary 2016-11-28 17:25:47 -08:00
impersonate-lge.com.rb rounding out snu support 2016-11-28 17:20:19 -08:00
json-list.rb cleanup on impersonation 2016-11-28 17:04:52 -08:00
README.md markdown updates 2016-11-28 16:54:10 -08:00
webos.paw cleanup on impersonation 2016-11-28 17:04:52 -08:00

LG webOS

TV

name value
model 43UH6100
product 3.0
firmware 4.30.40
features app marketplace, live TV listings
vulnerabilities all phone-home calls are done over HTTP

the 43UH6100 is a 'smart' TV, running LG's webOS since it is a fair assumption it is running OpenWrt underneath, the original goal was rooting the device, but initial investigations showed some other interesting vectors

digging

nmap

from nmap -PN -sV <device>, we get:

PORT     STATE SERVICE  VERSION
1175/tcp open  upnp
3000/tcp open  http     LG smart TV http service
3001/tcp open  ssl/http LG smart TV http service
9998/tcp open  http     Google Chromecast httpd

aside from the obvious flag running of both HTTP and HTTPS versions of (likely) the same service, interested to see that the Chromecast plugged in to the TV is also being exposed on the same IP as the TV

since there is an LG smart TV app available for Android/iOS, assuming that there is an API of some sort running on 3000 or 3001, so:

$ curl http://<device>:3000
Hello world

we see the same response on 3001, but have to use -k as the device uses a self-signed certificate

so, something is there, we just don't know how to talk to it yet

sniffing

switching tactics and connected the TV to a wireless network that has a tap, and we start to see some interesting things:

on boot

every time the TV starts up, within 30 seconds, it calls home:

POST /CheckSWAutoUpdate.laf HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: snu.lge.com:80
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 572

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
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 08:23:56 GMT
Content-length: 508
Content-type: application/octet-stream;charset=UTF-8
Pragma: no-cache;
Expires: -1;
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary;

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

that looks a lot like base64 encoded data, and when decoded, yields

request:

<REQUEST>
  <PRODUCT_NM>webOSTV 3.0</PRODUCT_NM>
  <MODEL_NM>HE_DTV_W16P_AFADATAA</MODEL_NM>
  <SW_TYPE>FIRMWARE</SW_TYPE>
  <MAJOR_VER>04</MAJOR_VER>
  <MINOR_VER>30.40</MINOR_VER>
  <COUNTRY>US2</COUNTRY>
  <COUNTRY_GROUP>US</COUNTRY_GROUP>
  <DEVICE_ID>de:ad:be:ef:ca:fe</DEVICE_ID>
  <AUTH_FLAG>N</AUTH_FLAG>
  <IGNORE_DISABLE>N</IGNORE_DISABLE>
  <ECO_INFO>01</ECO_INFO>
  <CONFIG_KEY>00</CONFIG_KEY>
  <LANGUAGE_CODE>en-US</LANGUAGE_CODE>
</REQUEST>

pretty standard, but the auth_flag, ignore_disable and config_key values are potentially interesting

response:

<RESPONSE>
  <RESULT_CD>900</RESULT_CD>
  <MSG>Success</MSG>
  <REQ_ID>00000000000000000001</REQ_ID>
  <IMAGE_URL></IMAGE_URL>
  <IMAGE_SIZE></IMAGE_SIZE>
  <IMAGE_NAME></IMAGE_NAME>
  <UPDATE_MAJOR_VER></UPDATE_MAJOR_VER>
  <UPDATE_MINOR_VER></UPDATE_MINOR_VER>
  <FORCE_FLAG></FORCE_FLAG>
  <KE></KE>
  <GMT>16 Nov 2016 08:23:56 GMT</GMT>
  <ECO_INFO>01</ECO_INFO>
  <CDN_URL></CDN_URL>
  <CONTENTS></CONTENTS>
</RESPONSE>

much more interesting than the request:

key assumption
IMAGE_URL the URL of a firmware update
IMAGE_SIZE the size of the firmware update - are they doing this instead of checksum?
IMAGE_NAME the name of the firmware update - not sure why this is necessary
UPDATE_MAJOR_VER the major version of the firmware update
UPDATE_MINOR_VER the minor version of the firmware update
FORCE_FLAG whether or not to force the update - unclear if true
CDN_URL URL that the firmware update is available at
CONTENTS none

half an hour of playing around with both the input and output here didn't yield any immediate results, but there is definite potential

to speed this along, observe a session where the TV updated its firmware from the manufacturer

when configuring the cable connections, the TV makes a number of calls:

request:

GET /fts/gftsDownload.lge?biz_code=IBS&func_code=ONLINE_EPG_FILE&file_path=/ibs/online/epg_file/20161116/f_1479280636996tmsepgcrawler_merged000004417_201611160600_06_20161116070000.zip HTTP/1.1
Host: aic-ngfts.lge.com
Accept: */*

response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="f_1479280636996tmsepgcrawler_merged000004417_201611160600_06_20161116070000.zip"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary;
Last-Modified: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 07:25:17 GMT
Content-Length: 135700
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;charset=UTF-8
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 08:24:01 GMT
Connection: keep-alive

parameters in request:

parameter assumption
biz_code none
func_code none
file_path none

looking at the file path, if not in a chroot'd environment, potential for ~LFI - attempts thus far have shown nothing but 404

looking at the file itself:

$ curl -o foo "http://aic-ngfts.lge.com/fts/path"
  % Total    % Received % Xferd  Average Speed   Time    Time     Time  Current
                                 Dload  Upload   Total   Spent    Left  Speed
100  132k  100  132k    0     0   230k      0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:--  230k
$ file foo
foo: Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
$ unzip foo
Archive:  foo
  inflating: schedule.json
  inflating: program.json
schedule.json

sample entry:

{
  "dbAction": "I",
  "schdId": "100006/EP010865380045/2016-11-11-10:00",
  "contentId": "EP010865380045",
  "seqNo": "0",
  "chanCode": "100006",
  "strtTime": "2016,11,11,10,00,00",
  "strtTimeLong": 1478858400,
  "endTime": "2016,11,11,12,00,00",
  "endTimeLong": 1478865600,
  "schdSummary": "",
  "timeType": "",
  "schdPgmTtl": "Late Night Gifts",
  "schdSubTtl": "Lisa Rinna",
  "rebrdcstFlag": "Y",
  "capFlag": "",
  "liveFlag": "",
  "dataBrdcstFlag": "",
  "scExplnBrdcstFlag": "",
  "scQualityGbn": "",
  "signBrdcstFlag": "",
  "voiceMultiBrdcstCount": "",
  "threeDFlag": "",
  "schdAdultClassCode": "-1",
  "schdAgeGrdCode": "TVG",
  "pgmGrId": "SH010865380000",
  "genreCode": "61",
  "realEpsdNo": "0"
}
program.json
{
  "dbAction": "I",
  "contentId": "EP000000510045",
  "seqNo": "0",
  "pgmGrId": "SH000000510000",
  "connectorId": "1013932",
  "serId": "184628",
  "serNo": "",
  "seasonId": "7895341",
  "seasonNo": "3",
  "pgmType": "Series",
  "realEpsdNo": "1",
  "summary": "Whitley encounters a new Dwayne on the plane ride back to school.",
  "pgmImgUrlName": "http://ngfts.lge.com/fts/gftsDownload.lge?biz_code=IBS&func_code=TMS_PROGRAM_IMG&file_path=/ibs/tms/program_img/p184628_b_v7_ab.jpg",
  "orgGenreType": "",
  "orgGenreCode": "188",
  "oGenreCode": "2",
  "oGenreType": "",
  "subGenreType": "",
  "subGenreCode": "",
  "makeCom": "",
  "makeCntry": "",
  "makeYear": "1989-09-28",
  "usrPplrSt": "",
  "pplrSt": "",
  "audLang": "en",
  "dataLang": "ENG",
  "audQlty": "",
  "genreImgUrl": "http://aic-ngfts.lge.com/fts/gftsDownload.lge?biz_code=IBS&func_code=GENRE_IMG&file_path=/ibs/genre_img_v/2_36_V_Sitcom.png",
  "vodFlag": "N",
  "pgmImgSize": "V480X720",
  "genreImgSize": "V480X704",
  "lgGenreCode2": "36",
  "lgGenreName2": "Sitcom",
  "programLock": "",
  "castingFlag": "Y"
}

application marketplace

bar

impersonating

baz

channel guide

barney

application update

fizzbang