# LG webOS - [TV](#TV) - [digging](#digging) - [nmap](#nmap) - [sniffing](#sniffing) - [on boot](#on-boot) - [channel search](#channel-search) - [application marketplace](#application-marketplace) - [impersonating](#impersonating) - [channel guide](#channel-guide) - [application update](#application-update) ## TV name|value ----|----- model|43UH6100 product|`3.0` firmware|`4.30.40` features|app marketplace, live TV listings vulnerabilities|all phone-home calls are done over `HTTP` the `43UH6100` is a 'smart' TV, running LG's [webOS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebOS) since it is a fair assumption it is running [OpenWrt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenWrt) underneath, the original goal was rooting the device, but initial investigations showed some other interesting vectors ## digging ### nmap from `nmap -PN -sV `, we get: ``` PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 1175/tcp open upnp 3000/tcp open http LG smart TV http service 3001/tcp open ssl/http LG smart TV http service 9998/tcp open http Google Chromecast httpd ``` aside from the obvious flag running of both HTTP and HTTPS versions of (likely) the same service, interested to see that the Chromecast plugged in to the TV is also being exposed on the same IP as the TV since there is an [LG smart TV](http://www.lg.com/us/experience-tvs/smart-tv) app available for [Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lge.tv.remoteapps&hl=en)/[iOS](https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/lg-tv-remote/id509979485), assuming that there is an API of some sort running on `3000` or `3001`, so: ``` $ curl http://:3000 Hello world ``` we see the same response on `3001`, but have to use `-k` as the device uses a self-signed certificate so, something is there, we just don't know how to talk to it yet ### sniffing switching tactics and connected the TV to a wireless network that has a tap, and we start to see some interesting things: #### on boot every time the TV starts up, within 30 seconds, it calls home: ``` POST /CheckSWAutoUpdate.laf HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* User-Agent: User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) Host: snu.lge.com:80 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 572 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 ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 08:23:56 GMT Content-length: 508 Content-type: application/octet-stream;charset=UTF-8 Pragma: no-cache; Expires: -1; Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary; 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 ``` that looks a lot like base64 encoded data, and when decoded, yields request: ```xml webOSTV 3.0 HE_DTV_W16P_AFADATAA FIRMWARE 04 30.40 US2 US de:ad:be:ef:ca:fe N N 01 00 en-US ``` pretty standard, but the `auth_flag`, `ignore_disable` and `config_key` values are potentially interesting response: ```xml 900 Success 00000000000000000001 16 Nov 2016 08:23:56 GMT 01 ``` much more interesting than the request: key |assumption -------------------|----------- `IMAGE_URL` | the URL of a firmware update `IMAGE_SIZE` | the size of the firmware update - are they doing this instead of checksum? `IMAGE_NAME` | the name of the firmware update - not sure why this is necessary `UPDATE_MAJOR_VER` | the major version of the firmware update `UPDATE_MINOR_VER` | the minor version of the firmware update `FORCE_FLAG` | whether or not to force the update - unclear if true|false or 1|0 `CDN_URL` | URL that the firmware update is available at `CONTENTS` | none half an hour of playing around with both the input and output here didn't yield any immediate results, but there is definite potential to speed this along, observe a session where the TV updated its firmware from the manufacturer #### channel search when configuring the cable connections, the TV makes a number of calls: request: ``` GET /fts/gftsDownload.lge?biz_code=IBS&func_code=ONLINE_EPG_FILE&file_path=/ibs/online/epg_file/20161116/f_1479280636996tmsepgcrawler_merged000004417_201611160600_06_20161116070000.zip HTTP/1.1 Host: aic-ngfts.lge.com Accept: */* ``` response: ``` HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="f_1479280636996tmsepgcrawler_merged000004417_201611160600_06_20161116070000.zip" Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary; Last-Modified: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 07:25:17 GMT Content-Length: 135700 Content-Type: application/octet-stream;charset=UTF-8 Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2016 08:24:01 GMT Connection: keep-alive ``` parameters in request: parameter |assumption ------------|----------- `biz_code` | none `func_code` | none `file_path` | none looking at the file path, if not in a chroot'd environment, potential for ~LFI - attempts thus far have shown nothing but `404` looking at the file itself: ``` $ curl -o foo "http://aic-ngfts.lge.com/fts/path" % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed 100 132k 100 132k 0 0 230k 0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 230k $ file foo foo: Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract $ unzip foo Archive: foo inflating: schedule.json inflating: program.json ``` ##### `schedule.json` sample entry: ```json { "dbAction": "I", "schdId": "100006/EP010865380045/2016-11-11-10:00", "contentId": "EP010865380045", "seqNo": "0", "chanCode": "100006", "strtTime": "2016,11,11,10,00,00", "strtTimeLong": 1478858400, "endTime": "2016,11,11,12,00,00", "endTimeLong": 1478865600, "schdSummary": "", "timeType": "", "schdPgmTtl": "Late Night Gifts", "schdSubTtl": "Lisa Rinna", "rebrdcstFlag": "Y", "capFlag": "", "liveFlag": "", "dataBrdcstFlag": "", "scExplnBrdcstFlag": "", "scQualityGbn": "", "signBrdcstFlag": "", "voiceMultiBrdcstCount": "", "threeDFlag": "", "schdAdultClassCode": "-1", "schdAgeGrdCode": "TVG", "pgmGrId": "SH010865380000", "genreCode": "61", "realEpsdNo": "0" } ``` ##### `program.json` ```json { "dbAction": "I", "contentId": "EP000000510045", "seqNo": "0", "pgmGrId": "SH000000510000", "connectorId": "1013932", "serId": "184628", "serNo": "", "seasonId": "7895341", "seasonNo": "3", "pgmType": "Series", "realEpsdNo": "1", "summary": "Whitley encounters a new Dwayne on the plane ride back to school.", "pgmImgUrlName": "http://ngfts.lge.com/fts/gftsDownload.lge?biz_code=IBS&func_code=TMS_PROGRAM_IMG&file_path=/ibs/tms/program_img/p184628_b_v7_ab.jpg", "orgGenreType": "", "orgGenreCode": "188", "oGenreCode": "2", "oGenreType": "", "subGenreType": "", "subGenreCode": "", "makeCom": "", "makeCntry": "", "makeYear": "1989-09-28", "usrPplrSt": "", "pplrSt": "", "audLang": "en", "dataLang": "ENG", "audQlty": "", "genreImgUrl": "http://aic-ngfts.lge.com/fts/gftsDownload.lge?biz_code=IBS&func_code=GENRE_IMG&file_path=/ibs/genre_img_v/2_36_V_Sitcom.png", "vodFlag": "N", "pgmImgSize": "V480X720", "genreImgSize": "V480X704", "lgGenreCode2": "36", "lgGenreName2": "Sitcom", "programLock": "", "castingFlag": "Y" } ``` #### application marketplace bar # impersonating baz ## channel guide barney ## application update fizzbang