markdown updates, initial CUJO notes
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@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ shiny devices are fun, finding and poking holes in their interface is a _lot_ of
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## devices
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name | description | url
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-----|-------------|-----
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[CUJO](http://trycujo.com) | purposeful MiTM device for internet 'security'
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[LG webOS](http://www.lge.com) | HTTP phone home is never a good idea | [lg-webOS](lg_webOS)
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[HooToo TripMate series](http://www.hootoo.com) | there are lots of problems, some end up at root access | [hootoo](hootoo)
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[Philips Hue](http://www.meethue.com) | device communication insecure, Ruby library/CLI to control via REST HTTP | [hued](https://github.com/chorankates/hued)
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146
cujo/README.md
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146
cujo/README.md
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@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
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# CUJO
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- [device](#device)
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- [digging](#digging)
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- [nmap](#nmap)
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- [sniffing](#sniffing)
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- [impersonating](#impersonating)
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- [phone home](#phone-home)
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## TV
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name|value
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----|-----
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model|TODO
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product|`TODO`
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firmware|`TODO`
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features|TODO
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vulnerabilities|all phone-home calls are done over `HTTP`
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## digging
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### nmap
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from `nmap -PN -sV <device>`, we get:
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```
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<TODO all ports are closed>
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```
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### sniffing
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watching the network activity of the device (`192.168.1.108`), noticed it tried to resolve:
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* agent.cujo.io
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* jenkins.getcujo.com
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but since the network isn't allowing external traffic, the DNS resolution fails.
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the device continues to retry this, but takes no other action.
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using `dnsmasq`, spoof these addresses to something under out control (`192.168.1.106`), and now we see:
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```
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Frame 125229: 74 bytes on wire (592 bits), 74 bytes captured (592 bits)
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Ethernet II, Src: 192.168.1.108 (cc:d3:1e:d0:20:67), Dst: 192.168.1.106 (f4:0f:24:04:2e:8f)
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Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.108 (192.168.1.108), Dst: agent.cujo.io (192.168.1.106)
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Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 53455 (53455), Dst Port: 9443 (9443), Seq: 0, Len: 0
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Source Port: 53455
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Destination Port: 9443
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[Stream index: 14]
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[TCP Segment Len: 0]
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Sequence number: 0 (relative sequence number)
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Acknowledgment number: 0
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Header Length: 40 bytes
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Flags: 0x002 (SYN)
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Window size value: 14600
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[Calculated window size: 14600]
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Checksum: 0xaf14 [validation disabled]
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Urgent pointer: 0
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Options: (20 bytes), Maximum segment size, SACK permitted, Timestamps, No-Operation (NOP), Window scale
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Maximum segment size: 1460 bytes
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Kind: Maximum Segment Size (2)
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Length: 4
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MSS Value: 1460
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TCP SACK Permitted Option: True
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Timestamps: TSval 51225, TSecr 0
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No-Operation (NOP)
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Window scale: 5 (multiply by 32)
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```
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now we can see it is making some empty TCP request to `9443`
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## impersonating
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### phone home
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standing up a webserver on `9443`, we start to see traffic:
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```
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\x16\x03\x01\x02\x00\x01\x00\x01\xfc\x03\x03\xa1\xe1\x9d\x08\x88]*\xce\xe7G
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```
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```
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\x16\x03\x01\x02\x00\x01\x00\x01\xfc\x03\x03Gg\xed\xa3m\x02\x88\xbd\xf0\xd1\x1eS\xf0\xfbc\xfb\x80K\x8dD\xed\xfb\x9b\x8c\xa0\xb2\xc6C\xc8\x15\x86\xbb\x00\x00\xa0\xc00\xc0,\xc0(\xc0$\xc0\x14\xc0
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```
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requests starting with `\x16\x03\x01` are almost certainly HTTPS requests coming over HTTP, so try to forge a usable cert:
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```
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$ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout agents.cujo.io.pem -out agents.cujo.io.pem -days 365 -nodes
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Generating a 2048 bit RSA private key
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........................................................................................+++
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..........................................................................................................+++
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writing new private key to 'agents.cujo.io.pem'
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-----
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You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
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into your certificate request.
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What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
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There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
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For some fields there will be a default value,
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If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
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-----
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Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:US
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State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:California
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Locality Name (eg, city) []:Los Angeles
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Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:CUJO
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Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
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Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []:agent.cujo.io
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Email Address []:
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$ openssl x509 -text -in agents.cujo.io.pem
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Certificate:
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Data:
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Version: 3 (0x2)
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Serial Number:
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e6:5b:e3:de:c4:4f:13:7e
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Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
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Issuer: C=US, ST=California, L=Los Angeles, O=CUJO, CN=agent.cujo.io
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Validity
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Not Before: Nov 29 01:38:50 2016 GMT
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Not After : Nov 29 01:38:50 2017 GMT
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Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=Los Angeles, O=CUJO, CN=agent.cujo.io
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Subject Public Key Info:
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Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
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RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
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Modulus (2048 bit):
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...
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Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
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X509v3 extensions:
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X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
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B2:33:5E:3A:3D:6E:B8:DC:D8:19:89:A2:B5:67:1C:99:B1:B0:2F:2F
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X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
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keyid:...
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DirName:/C=US/ST=California/L=Los Angeles/O=CUJO/CN=agent.cujo.io
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serial:...
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X509v3 Basic Constraints:
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CA:TRUE
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Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
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...
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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...
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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```
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