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Conor Horan-Kates 2016-11-28 16:54:10 -08:00
parent 45589f54e6
commit 33606353b0
2 changed files with 12 additions and 11 deletions
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1
README.md
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@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ shiny devices are fun, finding and poking holes in their interface is a _lot_ of
## devices
name | description | url
-----|-------------|-----
[LG webOS](http://www.lge.com) | HTTP phone home is never a good idea | [lg-webOS](#lg_webOS)
[HooToo TripMate series](http://www.hootoo.com) | there are lots of problems, some end up at root access | [hootoo](hootoo)
[Philips Hue](http://www.meethue.com) | device communication insecure, Ruby library/CLI to control via REST HTTP | [hued](https://github.com/chorankates/hued)
[RAV FileHub](http://www.ravpower.com/ravpower-rp-wd02-filehub-6000mah-power-bank.html) | a HooToo by any other name.. but with a twist | [rav-filehub](rav-filehub)

22
lg_webOS/README.md
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@ -4,12 +4,12 @@
- [digging](#digging)
- [nmap](#nmap)
- [sniffing](#sniffing)
- [on boot](#onboot)
- [channel search](#channelsearch)
- [application marketplace](#applicationmarketplace)
- [on boot](#on-boot)
- [channel search](#channel-search)
- [application marketplace](#application-marketplace)
- [impersonating](#impersonating)
- [channel guide](#channelguide)
- [application update](#applicationupdate)
- [channel guide](#channel-guide)
- [application update](#application-update)
## TV
name|value
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ vulnerabilities|all phone-home calls are done over `HTTP`
the `43UH6100` is a 'smart' TV, running LG's [webOS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebOS)
since it is a fair assumption it is running [OpenWrt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenWrt) underneath, the original goal
was rooting the device, but initial investigations showed some other interesting vectors.
was rooting the device, but initial investigations showed some other interesting vectors
## digging
@ -39,18 +39,18 @@ PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
```
aside from the obvious flag running of both HTTP and HTTPS versions of (likely) the same service,
interested to see that the Chromecast plugged in to the TV is also being exposed on the same IP as the TV.
interested to see that the Chromecast plugged in to the TV is also being exposed on the same IP as the TV
since there is an [LG smart TV](TODO) app available for Android/iOS, assuming that there is an API of some sort running on `3000` or `3001`, so:
since there is an [LG smart TV](http://www.lg.com/us/experience-tvs/smart-tv) app available for [Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lge.tv.remoteapps&hl=en)/[iOS](https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/lg-tv-remote/id509979485), assuming that there is an API of some sort running on `3000` or `3001`, so:
```
$ curl http://<device>:3000
Hello world
```
we see the same response on `3001`, but have to use `-k` as the device uses a self-signed certificate.
we see the same response on `3001`, but have to use `-k` as the device uses a self-signed certificate
so, something is there, we just don't know how to talk to it yet.
so, something is there, we just don't know how to talk to it yet
### sniffing
@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ key |assumption
`CONTENTS` | none
half an hour of playing around with both the input and output here didn't yield any immediate results, but there is definite potential.
half an hour of playing around with both the input and output here didn't yield any immediate results, but there is definite potential
to speed this along, observe a session where the TV updated its firmware from the manufacturer